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Abstract
Cryptocurrencies, led by bitcoin launched in 2009, have obtained wide attention
due to the emerging Blockchain in recent years. Anonymous cryptocurrencies
are highly essential since users want to preserve their privacy when conducting
transactions. However, some users might misbehave with the cover of anonymity
such as rampant trafficking and extortion. Thus, it is important to balance
anonymity and accountability of anonymous cryptocurrencies. In this paper,
we solve this issue by proposing a linkable group signature (LGS) for signing
cryptocurrency transactions, which can be used to trace a payer’s identity in
consortium blockchain based anonymous cryptocurrencies, in case the payer
tries illegal activities. A payer keeps anonymous if he/she behaves honestly.
We prove that the proposed scheme achieves full-anonymity, full-traceability
and linkability in the random oracle. Implementation of the proposed LGS
scheme demonstrates its high efficiency thus, can be adopted in anonymous
cryptocurrencies in reality.
Keywords: Cryptocurrency, Consortium Blockchain, Group Signature,
Accountability
1. Introduction
Cryptocurrency is a medium of exchange by applying cryptographic tech-
niques to enable secure transactions. A significants difference between tradi-
tional e-cash system and cryptocurrencies is the former need a central third
party while the latter do not. In cryptocurrencies, transactions are recorded
in through a distributed public ledger called Blockchain[1], which has attracted
extensive attention from academia and industry. Several papers [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10] have studied related security issues.
Anonymity, which protects users’ privacy in cryptocurrency transactions, is
one of the most prominent characteristics of cryptocurrencies. In the meantime,
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it may also lead to some new threats such as rampant trafficking, extortion,
smugglers’ business, tax evasion and money laundering. Worse still, it is hard
to trace the criminals with the cover of anonymity. Unfortunately, criminal
activities using cryptocurrencies have emerged in recent years. An example is
Silk Road, a black market for illegal drugs and illicit goods. It trades by using
Bitcoin[1] for payment and hides service with Tor 1.Another example is Not-
Petya 2 ransomware, which was used to launch a global cyber attack and hacked
over 80 companies in a host of countries led by Ukraine. NotPetya extracts pass-
words from local files by encrypting the entire hard disk, and then victims were
asked to pay $300 in cryptocurrency to unlock their computers. Maersk, the
world’s largest container ship and supplier, has caused a loss about $200-$300
million due to the business interruption caused by NotPetya. It is sad that
the wrecker has not been catched till now. Hence, anonymous cryptocurrencies
must be regulated to prevent the abuse of anonymity.
Traceability is an effective way for supervision. Most cryptocurrencies such
as Bitcoin record transaction history on a pubic Blockchain, where anyone can
join, access and leave anytime. This kind of cryptocurrencies usually protect
users’ privacy with a pseudonyms mechanism, in which a user is identified by the
hash of his/her public key and a user could generate a multitude of public keys
as their deterministic wallets[11]-[12]. What can be traced of a suspicious user is
the transaction addresses or wallets instead of his/her real-world identities un-
der this pseudonyms mechanism. Actually, the traced addresses are the hashed
public key of the user, i.e., random bit-strings. Only tracing addresses or wal-
lets are not enough in some real-world applications. For example, Monero[13],
another popular cryptocurrency, takes advantage of one-time address mecha-
nism to protect payee’ privacy. It makes no sense to trace this one-time address
when the payee becomes a malicious payer since this address will not be used
any longer. In public blockchain based anonymous cryptocurrency systems, it is
hard to trace the real identity of a user due to the employment of pseudonyms
mechanism. Consortium blockchain based anonymous cryptocurrencies provide
a potential solution to this problem.
Group signature[15]-[18], which achieves traceability through a group man-
ager, can be applied to consortium blockchain based anonymous cryptocurren-
cies tracing. Users register with the group manager as a new group member,
then he can sign transactions represent the whole group without exposing iden-
tity, where group manager can trace the suspectable users in a anonymity cryp-
tocurrency trading. Due to the anonymity provided by group signatures, nat-
urally, we hold the view that how to determine two transactions are generated
by the same signer instantly and effectively.
Related Work. Koshy et al. [20] constructed a mapping from Bitcoin ac-
counts to IP addresses according to examine the real-time transactions to find
the account owners. Reid et al. [21] acquired a sea of transactions from public
1https://www.onion-router.net/
2https://zh.wikipedia.org/wiki/NotPetya
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Blockchain and try to model the Bitcoin flow, they attempt to link multiple
addresses to the identical user by analyzing their topology structure and ad-
dresses reusing. Kumar et al. [22]introduced a statistical analysis regarding
Monero transactions tracing. The success rate of traceability is limited by the
number of users in the anonymity trading set. In 2016, Danezis et al. [23]
proposed RSCoin, a cryptocurrency based on central banks who completely in-
volved in controlling monetary policy, had been issued by the bank of England.
In 2017, Cecchetii el at. [24] presented a confidential distributed ledger named
Solidus, where all users’ accounts are maintained by banks and transactions
are executed between diverse banks. Users whether payers or payees can not
be openly traced even their pseudonyms except for the bank that owners their
accounts. In addition, Garman et al. [25] introduced a tracing mechanisms
supporting optional users tracing and cryptocurrency tracing by utilizing cryp-
tographic tools. Nevertheless, the solutions aforementioned can only trace to
user’s accounts instead of their real-world identities.
Our Contributions. The contributions of this paper are listed as follows.
1. We suggest to use linkable group signatures to realize payers’ real iden-
tity tracing in consortium blockchain based anonymous cryptocurrency
systems. This approach provides a tradeoff between anonymity and ac-
countability in anonymous cryptocurrencies.
2. We propose a concrete construction of linkable group signature based on
the group signature due to Boneh and Boyen [29]. The proposed scheme
makes use of linear encryption to help the group manager to trace a group
member’s identity, and generates a group signature by generating a zero-
knowledge proof of knowledge (ZKPK) of a triple tuple of VR-SDH. If
a group member signs the same message twice, the two signatures can
be publicly linked, which can be used for double-spending detection in
anonymous cryptocurrencies.
3. We prove the security of our linkable group signature scheme including full-
anonymity, full-traceability and linkability in the random oracle model.
4. We implement the proposed linkable group signature on the desktop,
which shows its practicability in reality.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Some prelim-
inaries of our scheme are prepared in Section 2. We describe our system model
and security requirements in Section 3. The details of our scheme is provided in
Section 4, then it followed the security analysis and performance evaluation are
given in Section 5 and Section 6 respectively. Finally, we conclude our paper in
Section 7.
2. Preliminaries
2.1. Bilinear Groups
The security of our scheme rely on the assumption of bilinear group. We
say (G1, G2) be a bilinear group if following properties holds: G1,G2 denote
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two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p, satisfied G1 =< g1 > and
G2 =< g2 >. A computable isomorphism ϕ is constructed from G1 to G2 such
that g1 = ϕ(g2). eˆ be a bilinear map [26] eˆ : G1 ×G2 −→ GT such that:
Bilinearity. eˆ(ha0 , h
b
1) = eˆ(h0, h1)
ab holds for all h0 ∈ G1, h1 ∈ G2 and
a, b ∈ Zp.
Non-degenerate. eˆ does not map h0, h1 to the identity 1GT such that eˆ(h0, h1) 6=
1GT , where 1GT is the identity of group GT .
It is efficient to compute eˆ(h0, h1), isomorphism ϕ andG1, G1 as aforementioned,
whether G1 = G2 or G1 6= G2.
2.2. Complexity assumption
(q-Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem.) Boneh and Boyen [27] defined q-
Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem in the bilinear group pair (G1, G2) stating that
given a (q+ 2)-tuple (g1, g2, g
γ
2 , g
(γ2)
2 , ..., g
(γq)
2 ) for random γ ← Zp, it is imprac-
ticable to output a pair (g
1/(γ+x)
1 , x) where x← Zp.
The advantage of adversary A to settle q-SDH problem defined as follow:
AdvSDHA = Pr
[
A(g1, g2, gγ2 , g(γ
2)
2 , ..., g
(γq)
2 ) = (g
1
(γ+x)
1 , x)
]
Definition 1.(q-Strong Diffie-Hellman in (G1, G2)) We say that (q, t, )−SDH
assumption holds in (G1, G2) if no t-time adversary solves SDH with advantage
AdvSDHA at least  in (G1, G2).
(q-Variant Strong Diffie-Hellman Problem.) Fuchsbsuer et al.[28] intro-
duced the hardness of SDH implies that the following problem is intractable:
given g1, g2, h, g
γ
2 and q−1 distinct triples (xi, yi, (g1 ·h−yi)
1
γ+xi ), output a fresh
triple (x, y, (g1 · h−y) 1γ+x ).
The advantage of adversary A to settle q-VR-SDH problem defined as follow:
AdvV R−SDHA = Pr
[
A((x1, y1, (g1·h−y1)
1
γ+x1 ), ..., (xq−1, yq−1, (g1·h−yq−1)
1
γ+xq−1 )
= (x, y, (g1 · h−y) 1γ+x )
]
Definition 2.(Variant q-Strong Diffie-Hellman in (G1, G2)) We say that
(q, t, )−VR-SDH assumption holds in (G1, G2) if no t-time adversary solves
VR-SDH with advantage AdvV R−SDHA at least  in (G1, G2).
(Decision Linear Problem) Boneh and Boyen [29] proposed it is infeasible to
solve the problem as follows: given v1, v2, u, v
a
1 , v
b
2, u
c ∈ G1, output 1 if a+b = c,
otherwise 0.
The advantage of adversary A to distinguish the DL Problem is defined as
follows:
AdvLinearA = Pr
[
A(v1, v2, u, va1 , vb2, ua+b) = 1 : v1, v2, u ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Zp
]
−
[
A(v1, v2, u, va1 , vb2, η) = 1 : v1, v2, u, η ∈ G1, a, b ∈ Zp
]
Definition 3.(Decision Linear in G1) We say that Decision Linear assump-
tion holds in G1 if no t-time adversary Adv
Linear
A decides DL problem with
advantage at least  in G1.
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2.3. Signature of Knowledge
CS[32] advocated the primitive of the signature of knowledge for the first
time, which is a transformation from a interactive proof system to a non-
interactive proof system by letting the challenge equals the hash value of the
commitment concatenate the message to be signed. Take
∑−protocol as an
example,
∑
= (Setup, Sign, V erify) be a signature of knowledge for a NP-
relation R, where language L = {h : ∃ω, s.t.(ω, h) ∈ R}. the specific algorithm
is showed as follows:
• Setup(1λ): This algorithm takes security parameter λ as inputs, and out-
put a public parameter pp.
• Sign(m,ω, h): This algorithm takes message m and a pair (ω, h) ∈ R as
inputs, and output a witness Π of signature of knowledge.
• V erify(m,h,Π): This algorithm takes message m, a statement h and a
signature of knowledge Π as inputs, and output a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
Chase et.al[31] defined the formal security of SoK, which is called SimExt−
secure. A SimExt− secure SoK of a witness ω for language L consists of the
following properties:
Correctness. For any relation satisfied (ω, h) ∈ R with message m, there
exists a negligible function f such that
Pr
[
V er(m,h,Π) = 1 : pp← Setup(1λ),Π← Sign(m,ω, h)
]
≥ 1− f(λ)
Simulatability. There exits a polynomial time simulator s.t it is infea-
sible to distinguish the transcription of simulator which denotes as Sim =
(Simsetup, Simsign) and the real protocol transcription for any PPT adver-
saries A, for a negligible function f such thatPr[(pp, θ)← Simset(1λ); b← ASim(pp)]−
Pr[pp← Gen(1λ); b← ASign(pp)] ≤ f(λ)

Where θ denotes an traditional trapdoor, in which the simulator to simulate a
signature under the situation without the witness ω.
Extraction. There exists another polynomial time extractor called Ext,
which can extract the witness ω when he knows a trapdoor θ and a pair tran-
scription of simulator. For a negligible function f such that
Pr
[
(ω, h) ∈ R ∨ (m,h) ∈ QS ∨ V er(m,h,Π) = 0 : (pp, θ)← Simsetup(1λ),
(m,h,Π)← ASim(pp), ω ← (Ext(pp, θ,m, h,Π))] ≤ f(λ)
Where QS is the list of Simsign Oracle query, which is enumerated the success-
ful queries made by A.
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2.4. Linear Encryption
In our scheme, we utilize the linear encryption scheme, which is the extension
of ElGamal encryption scheme based on decision linear problem in Section 2.
The details of the algorithm are as follows.
• KeyGen(λ): This algorithm takes security parameter λ as inputs, it ran-
domly selects generators v1, v2, u ∈ G1 and sets k1, k2 ∈ Zp as private
key satisfied vk11 = v
k2
2 = u, it outputs the key pair (p = (v1, v2, u), s =
(k1, k2)).
• Enc(m, p): This algorithm takes message m, public key p as inputs, it
chooses random value x, y ∈ Zp and encrypt m as c = (vx1 , vy2 ,m · ux+y).
it outputs the ciphertext of m be c.
• Dec(c, s): This algorithm takes message m, ciphertext c and the private
key s as inputs, m = c3/(c
k1
1 · ck22 ) is computed by the one who knows the
secrete key (k1, k2). it outputs m.
It is widely believed that ElGamal encryption against a chosen-plaintext
attack. As an extension of ElGamal encryption, linear encryption provides the
same level of security as ElGamal emcryption under decision linear assumption.
3. Models and Requirements
3.1. System Model
There are three entities in our scheme. Users register with the registration
authority(RA) to be a legal member in a group as shown in Figure 2. Users
could be vicious, which means that he may try to fraud RA to obtain a real
certificate and forges a signature. RA, who takes charge of the private key
of enrollment, can award a certificate to a honest users and he is defined as
honest, it means that he follows the protocol to perform the tasks allotted to
him, meanwhile he possesses a registration list, which storages the identity of
group members. There exists a supervision authority(SA), who is in charge of
the private of tracing. he will regulate the behavior of illegal users by the way
to trace the specific users’ identity. Two signatures signed by the same user
could be publicly linked by all members in a group.
Definition 4. (Linkable group signature). A linkable group signature in-
cludes a tuple of polynomial time algorithms (Setup, Join, Sign, V erify, Link,
Trace,) such that:
• (GPK)← Setup(n): This is a probabilistic algorithm that inputs a secu-
rity parameter n and outputs the group public parameters GPK.
• (Cert,GSKU ) ← Join(GPK,SKR, PKU ): This is a protocol between
RA and users, it takes GPK, the private SKR of RA and user’s public
key PKU as inputs, outputs the corresponding membership certificate
Cert, and membership private key GSKU of user.
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Figure 1: System model
• (σ) ← Sign(GPK,GSKU ,m, amount): This is a probabilistic algorithm
that inputs GPK, membership private key GSKU , message m and an
amount amount ∈ {0, 1}∗ outputs a signature σ.
• (1/0)← V erify(GPK,m, σ, amount): The algorithm inputs GPK, mes-
sage m, a alleged signature σ, an amount amount ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs
a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
• (1/0)← Link(GPK, (m,σ), (m′, σ′)): The algorithm takes the public pa-
rameter GPK, two tuples of signature (m,σ), (m′, σ′) as inputs and out-
puts a bit b ∈ {0, 1}.
• (PKU , Cert) ← Trace(GPK,SKS ,m, σ): The algorithm takes GPK,
message m, a valid signatures σ as inputs and outputs the users’ iden-
tity PKU and certificate Cert.
3.2. Security Requirements
There are diversiform security requirements of group signature has been
proposed. Among all of them, two crucial properties be summarized by Bellare
et.al.[30] in 2003 and they showed all other requirements are implied by them,
which is full-anonymity and full-traceability. In 2018, Wu et.al.[30] introduced
the security requirements of the linkable group signature, which is correctness,
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full-anonymity, full-traceabitity, and linkability. We follow this formal definition,
but, their scheme achieves conditional linkability while our scheme could reach
public linkability.
Correctness: The correctness ensures that the signature generated by hon-
est users always be accepted, two signatures produced with the same secret key
could be linked correctly all the time, and any valid signature can be traced to
the actual signer invariably with SA’s tracing key.
Full-Anonymity: Given two signatures and a signer either one of them, no
one could determine which of two signatures was produced by the known signer
with advantage over one-half except SA. Boneh et.[29] showed a relax definition
named CPA-full-anonymity, which cancels accessing to the tracing oracle. They
also explained this requirement is enough.
Full-Traceability: Full-traceability is stronger than traceability, it also
could be viewed as a strong form of collusion-resistance. Specifically, an ad-
versary created a signature according to the collusion of other group members
even holds the SA’s trace key cannot be traced to one of the actual signer by
SA with negligible probability.
Linkability: An adversary generated two signatures with the same secret
key for the same amount without being linked by other group members with
negligible probability.
4. The Linkable Group Signature Construction
4.1. Overview
The system works as follows. First, the Registration Authority and the
Supervision Authority initialize the system parameters. Then, users register
with the RA as new group member. When users register on the RA, he is
awarded a certificate, in which is the part of his private key in a group. As
a result, only segmental users’ private key is known by RA, and the rest is
only known by himself. Next, users produce a signature on one message with a
linkable group signature. Two signatures for the same amount can be publicly
linked, while only the SA has right to trace who is the misbehaving users.
Finally, SA reals users’ identity with his tracing secret key, and gets the index
i in a group according to the registration list given by the RA.
4.2. The details of protocol
• Setup:
1.Init(Commonparameter) : Let n be a security parameter, and eˆ be a
bilinear pairing. (G1, G2) denotes a bilinear group pair with computable
isomorphism ϕ. Assume SDH problem is hard on (G1, G2) meanwhile
decision linear problem is intractable on G1. Define H0 : {0, 1}∗ → G1,
H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, denote collision-resistant hash. Randomly choose a
generator g2 in G2, choose generator g1, h, u in G1 such that g2 = ϕ(g1).
2.RASetup : The RA randomly selects γ ∈R Zp, and sets ω = gγ2 . γ is
the private key of RA. So that PKR = ω, SKR = γ.
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3.SASetup : The SA chooses a generator v1, v2 ∈R G1. Select k1, k2 ∈R
Zp such that v1
k1 = v2
k2 = u. It has PKS = u, SKS = (k1, k2).
Group public parameter be
GPK = (G1, G2, eˆ, p, n, g1, g2, h, u, v1, v2, ω,H0, H1).
• Join: User who expect to join the group must register RA at first, and gets
corresponding certificate as a new group member. The concrete protocol
as follows:
1.User randomly selects yi ∈ Z∗p sends Y = hyi to RA, in the meantime,
he shows the knowledge of the representation of Y to bases h:
PK{(yi) : Y = hyi}
2.RA randomly select xi ∈R Z∗p , sets Ai = (g1Y −1)
1
γ+xi with his private
key SKR = γ and sends (Ai, xi) to user.
3.User checks whether eˆ (Ai, ωg
xi
2 ) = eˆ (g1h
−yi , g2). If true, he agrees
(Ai, xi) as his Cert, sends Cert and Y = h
yi to RA, storages tuple
(Ai, xi, yi) be his private-key SKU [i].
4.RA maintains a registration list and (Cert, Y ) is added.
• Sign: In order to sign messagem ∈ {0, 1}∗ with a group of {A1, A2, . . . , An},
whereAi denotes the i
th users’ certificate. Using users’ private key SKU [i] =
(Ai, xi, yi) for the specified amount ∈ {0, 1}∗, compute u0 = H0(amount).
Randomly choosing α, β, and sets
l1 = v
α
1 , l2 = v
β
2 , l3 = Ai · uα+β , l4 = uxi0
δ1 = xi · α, δ2 = xi · β
Denote 1G1 is the identity element of G1. Then the signer executes the
non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge Π on m as follows:
SoK

α, β,xi,yi,
δ1, δ2
 :
l1 = v
α
1
∧ l2 = vβ2
∧ 1G1 = lxi1 · vδ11
∧ 1G1 = lxi1 · vδ11
∧ eˆ(g1,g2)eˆ(l3,ω) = eˆ(u, ω)−α−β ·eˆ(l3, g2)xi ·eˆ(u, g2)−δ1−δ1 ·eˆ(h, g2)yi
∧ l4 = uxi0

(m)
The linkable group signature on m of user i in an event event is σ =
(l1, l2, l3, l4,Π). Among l4 is the tag for linking.
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• V erify: Known a group public key GPK, the signature σ on m for the
specified amount ∈ {0, 1}∗, all members in the group can check the validity
of the signature:
1. Compute u0 = H0(amount), then generates
a˜1 = v
zα
1 · lc1, a˜2 = vzβ2 · lc2,
a˜3 = eˆ(u, ω)
−zα−zβ ·eˆ(l3, g2)zxi ·eˆ(u, g2)−zδ1−zδ1 ·eˆ(h, g2)zyi ·
(
eˆ(g1,g2)
eˆ(l3,ω)
)c
a˜4 = l
zxi
1 · vzα1 , a˜5 = l
zxi
2 · vzβ2 , a˜6 = lc4 · u
zxi
0
2. On the basis of aforementioned value, and computes
c˜ = H1(m, l1, l2, l3, l4, a˜1, a˜2, a˜3, a˜4, a˜5, a˜6)
3. Verify whether the equation c = c˜. It outputs 1 if equation is true and
0 otherwise.
• Link: Given different signature (m,σ) and (m′, σ′), anyone can publicly
link if two signatures are signed by the identical signer for the same
amount. Firstly verify if σ and σ′ is valid for m and m′ with V erify.
Then it can be directly known l4 from σ, l
′
4 from σ
′, decides whether
l4 = l
′
4.
• Trace: Given (m,σ), If σ is valid, SA tracing the original user by Ai =
l3
l
k1
1 ·l
k1
2
with his private key SKS = (k1, k2) . Then SA gets the index i in
a group through the registration table given by the RA.
4.3. Instantiation of the SoK
The non-interactive zero-knowledge proof-of-knowledge Π mentioned in sub-
section 4.2 actually is a signature of knowledge for message m. Here more details
are given below.
Signer chooses rα, rβ , rx, ry, rδ1 , rδ2 at random from zp, and computes
a1 = v
rα
1 , a2 = v
rβ
2 ,
a3 = eˆ(u, ω)
−rα−rβ ·eˆ(l3, g2)rx ·eˆ(u, g2)−rδ1−rδ2 ·eˆ(h, g2)ry
a4 = l
rx
1 · v−rδ11 , a5 = lrx1 · v−rδ22 , a6 = urx0
Then he sets c = H1(m, l1, l2, l3, l4, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6) ∈ zp.
Subsequently he computes
zα = rα − cα, zβ = rβ − cβ,
zx = rx − cx, zy = ry − cy,
zδ1 = rδ1 − cδ1, zδ2 = rδ2 − cδ2
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Finally it outputs Π is parsed as (c, zα, zβ , zx, zy, zδ1 , zδ2)
Verifier computes the following six equation to verify Π:
vzα1 = a1 · lc1
v
zβ
2 = a2 · lc2
eˆ(u, ω)−zα−zβ · eˆ(l3, g2)zx · eˆ(u, g2)−zδ1−zδ1 · eˆ(h, g2)zy = a3 ·
(
eˆ(g1, g2)
eˆ(l3, ω)
)c
lzx1 · v−zα1 = a4
lzx1 · v−zδ22 = a5
uzx0 = a6 · lc4
Verifier outputs 1 if c = H1(m, l1, l2, l3, l4, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6) ∈ Zp, other-
wise 0.
4.4. Correctness
The signature σ produced in section 4.2 is a signature of knowledge with
respect to message m, which is the transcript of zero proof of knowledge about
a pair (Ai, xi, yi) satisfies A
γ+xi
i h
yi = g1. Therefore, verifier will accept the sig-
nature if the transcript is verified in the light of the way in section 4.3 correctly.
In addition, the first three elements of any signature σ contains (l1, l2, l3) =
(vα1 , v
β
2 , Ai · uα+β), which is the Linear encryption of Ai. Supervision author-
ity, who owns SKS = (k1, k2), can decrypt it correctly and recover index i
corresponding Ai in a group of n members.
The same tag will be directly linked through comparing l4, which is the
fourth components of the signature σ. It means that the signature is generated
by the same signer for the same amount.
4.5. Extensions
Our registration protocol(Join) can achieve a stronger level of security to
protect the privacy of user’s identity, which is statistically zero-knowledge[33].
Specially, at the beginning of protocol execution, user randomly selects y˜i, r˜i ∈R
Zp, sends C1 = g
y˜i
1 g
r˜i
2 to the RA, in the meantime user executes the knowledge
of the representation of C1 to bases g1 and g2. Then if RA agree the proof,
he selects αi, βi ∈R Zp at random, and sends (αi, βi) to user. he computes
yi = αiy˜i + βi and sends C2 = h
yi to RA.
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5. Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze the security of the linkable group signature con-
struction in the random oracle mode. The security of our scheme is guaranteed
by following lemmas.
Lemma 1. Our scheme satisfies CPA-full-anonymous if Linear encryption
against chosen-plaintext attacks on G1 in the random oracle model.
Proof. We present it by reducing. Suppose there exists an adversary A that
breaks the anonymity of the linkable group signature, then we can construct a
algorithm A′ can break CPA-security of Linear encryption on G1. As described
in [29], Linear encryption can against a chosen-plaintext attack, it implies that
adversary A wins full-anonymous game with negligible advantage.
A′ is given a tuple (v1, v2, u) as public key of Linear encryption, then it runs
Setup algorithm to generate the group public parameter GPK and sends it to
A.
Join Queries: A can randomly choose yi ∈ Zp and query the random oracle
OJ , A′ executes Join protocol and responds with Cert = (Ai, xi).
Hash Queries: A is given u0 randomly selects from G1 if he queries H0 with
amount, when he requests H1, elements randomly chose from Zp is responded.
Challenge: A randomly picks two users corresponding their public keys
Y ∗i1 = h
yi1 and Y ∗i2 = h
yi2 , message m∗ and amount amount∗, A′ provides Ai1
and Ai2 as challenge message, and requests to the challenger in indistinguisha-
bility game of Linear encryption. The challenger responds with (l1, l2, l3), which
is the ciphertext of Aib such that b ∈ {0, 1}. A′ also chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} ran-
domly, and sets l4 = u
xib
0 , where u0 = H0(amount
∗). Then A′ gets a tuple tran-
script (l1, l2, l3, l4, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, c, zα, zβ , zx, zy, zδ1 , zδ2) by calling simula-
tor even A′ doesn’t know real α, β, xi, yi, which is indistinguishing with real
proof of zero-knowledge protocol about (Aib , xib , yib). In addition, algorithm A′
has to make H1(m, l1, l2, l3, l4, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6) = c is true, it stops if there
has a collision, otherwise it returns σ∗ = (l1, l2, l3, l4, c, zα, zβ , zx, zy, zδ1 , zδ2) to
A as challenge signature.
Guess: A outputs a guess b′, meanwhile A′ sends b′ as solution to the
challenger and it wins when b = b′. A wins in anonymity games when A′
succeeds in indistinguishable game of Linear encryption respect to Aib . If the
advantage of A is regarded AdvCPA−anoyA = , then algorithm A′ against a
chosen-plaintext attack of the Linear encryption with probability 1/2 + .
Lemma 2. Our scheme satisfies full-traceability if VR-SDH assumption
holds on (G1, G2).
Proof. We present it by reducing. We borrowed the skill with respect to the
security of full-traceability in [29], which is divided into three phases. Firstly,
a framework invokes a full-traceability game interact with an adversary A is
given. Secondly, instantiating the framework for different types of adversaries.
Thirdly, computing an VR-SDH solutions by applying Forking Lemma [29] to
the instantiation.
Phase I. Suppose there exists an adversaryA that breaks the full-traceability
of the linkable group signature, then it can be constructed a framework interact
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with A as follows.
Framework is given group public parameter GPK and a sets of VR-SDH tu-
ples (Ai, xi, yi) for i = 1, ..., nmost of them satisfied eˆ (Ai, ωg
xi
2 ) = eˆ (g1h
−yi , g2),
otherwise for i = , it means that xi is unknown, which corresponding to (Ai, yi).
Then it sends GPK and the private key of SA that SKS = (k1, k2) to A.
Hash Queries: A is given u0 randomly selects from G1 if he queries H0
with amount, when he requests the H1 of (m, l1, l2, l3, l4, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6),
framework randomly chooses c ∈ Zp, then returns c to A.
Join Queries: A can randomly chooses yi ∈ Zp and query the random
oracle OJ , when i 6=  framework returns Cert = (Ai, xi) to A. Otherwise, it
terminates.
Sign Queries: A asks for a signature of ith users on amount amount and
message m. If i 6= , framework generates a signature σ with real private key
(Ai, xi, yi). If i = , it computes u0 = H0(amount) and sets l1, l2, l3, l4 to
be vα1 , v
β
2 , Ai · uα+β , uxi0 for some random α, β ∈ Zp. Then it obtained a tu-
ple transcript (l1, l2, l3, l4, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6, c, zα, zβ , zx, zy, zδ1 , zδ2) by calling
simulator, where σ = (l1, l2, l3, l4, c, zα, zβ , zx, zy, zδ1 , zδ2) is originated. More-
over, it must mend the hash value in H1(m, l1, l2, l3, l4, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6) be
c, it terminates if a collision is occurred. Then it returns σ to A.
Forge. A outputs a signature σ = (l1, l2, l3, l4, c, zα, zβ , zx, zy, zδ1 , zδ2) on
message m, which can be traced to obtain A˜ with (k1, k2). If A˜ 6= Ai (i =
1, 2, ..., n), framework outputs σ. If A˜ = Ai∗ , xi∗ =  and Yi∗ is not queried to
join oracle occurs currently, it outputs σ, Otherwise, if xi∗ 6= , it exists.
Phase II. Due to different cases, we instantiate them by two types of forg-
ers. Forger A1 is given (g1, g2, ω) and n SDH-VR pairs (Ai, xi, yi), framework
interacts with A1 according to aforementioned process. If it can be perfectly
simulated, based on the success of A1, the framework succeeds. In this case, A1
succeeds with probability .
Forger A2 is given (g1, g2, ω) and n − 1 VR-SDH pairs (Ai, xi, yi), then
framework randomly selects Ai∗ from G1, and sets xi∗ = . Let these pairs
constitute a group with n members. If A2 forges a valid signature σ∗ that can
be traced to Ai∗ , at the same time, not for a moment does A2 query to OJ
at yi∗ , then the framework proclaims success. so that A2 outputs a imitative
linkable group signature that can trace to the user of i∗ with probability /n.
Phase III. We can obtain the solution of VR-SDH problem by applying
Forking Lemma to different forgers [29]. Linkable group signature can be
indicated as (m,σ0, c, σ1), where σ0 = (l1, l2, l3, l4, a1, a2, a3, a4, a5, a6), σ1 =
(zα, zβ , zx, zy, zδ1 , zδ2). It can be concluded that the framework obtains a set
of forgery (m,σ′0, c
′, σ′1) with probability ( − 1/p)2/4 when A1 succeeds, or
(/n − 1/p)2/4 when A2 succeeds. Furthermore, it generates another set of
forgery (m,σ′′0 , c
′′, σ′′1 ) with probability (−1/p)2/4qH if A1 succeeds, or (/n−
1/p)2/4qH if A2 succeeds, where qH is the number of hash function queries.
There exists a extractor can extract a solution of VR-SDH problem for two
forgeries (m,σ′0, c
′, σ′1) and (m,σ
′′
0 , c
′′, σ′′1 ), the framework declares success when
extracted tuple (A, x, y) is not distributed in those whose x is known.
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On the basis of aforesaid, if interacts with forger A1, framework can solve
VR-SDH problem with probability ( − 1/p)2/16qH . Otherwise interacts with
forger A2, it can return (A, x, y) as the solution of VR-SDH problem with (/n−
1/p)2/16qH . Due to it is widely believed the VR-SDH problem is intractable,
so forgers whether A1 or A2 succeeds to forge a linkable group signature with
negligible advantage.
Lemma 3. Our scheme satisfies linkability if VR-SDH assumption holds on
(G1, G2).
Proof. We present it by reducing. If the signature can be linked, it must
be signed by identical signer for the same amount with uniform private key
(Ai, xi, yi). Suppose there exists an PPT adversary A that breaks the linkability
of the linkable group signature, then it must be constructed an another PPT
algorithm A′ can solve VR-SDH problem with non-negligible probability.
Join Queries: A can randomly choose yi ∈ Zp and query the random oracle
OJ , A′ executes Join protocol and responds with Cert = (Ai, xi).
Hash Queries: A is given u0 randomly selects from G1 if he queries H0 with
amount, when he requests H1, elements randomly chose from Zp is responded.
Sign Queries: A asks for a signature of users private key (Ai, xi, yi) for
amount amount on message m. It is given a signature σ by the challenger, who
performs Sign algorithm.
Forge. A outputs (m′i1 , σ′i1) and (m′i2 , σ′i2) with respect to (A′i, x′i, y′i), where
(A′i, x
′
i, y
′
i) is not queried to the signature oracle OS . A wins if undermentioned
cases occurs concurrently.
V erify(GPK,m′i1 , σ
′
i1
) = 1, V erify(GPK,m′i2 , σ
′
i2
) = 1, l
i′1
4 6= li
′
2
4 .
where l
i′1
4 and l
i′2
4 are the fourth components of σ
′
i1
and σ′i2 . Then there can
be constructed a PPT algorithm A′ settles VR-SDH problem by computing
(A′′i , x
′′
i , y
′′
i ) other than (A
′
i, x
′
i, y
′
i) with non-negligible probability. Due to it is
widely believed VR-SDH is difficult, thereforeA succeeds to break the linkability
of linkable group signature with negligible probability.
6. Performance
6.1. Implementation analysis.
In this section, we discuss the implementation analysis of our scheme. We
conduct the simulations on a Win 10 64-bit desktop with 8.00 GB RAM and
Inter(R) Core(TM) i5-7400 CPU @ 3.00 GHz. All the algorithms are written in
C++ language and invoke the Miracl library for elliptic curve cryptography. We
use Visual Studio 2012 to compile all the programs. There are six algorithms
named Setup, Join, Sign, V erify, Link, Trace, we execute them under the
number of individuals varied from 3 to 10 and test each algorithm 20 times
separately on the desktop. Then we calculated the average running time of each
algorithm for different size of group as shown in Figure 2.
As displayed in Figure 2, group size is determined by the number of group
members. The time cost of Setup algorithm tend to be a constant with the
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Figure 2: Time cost of LGS algorithms for different size group
increasing of group members, nearly 41.125ms. This is due to initialization
variables are fixed per routs, hence, it takes approximately the identical time.
Moreover, the time consumption of Join algorithm grows linearly as member
grows in a group. The size of group varies from 3 to 10 and Join algorithm takes
44.25ms at least and 144.286ms at most, this result is rational. The implemen-
tation time that Sign algorithm and V erify algorithm costs respectively are
exceedingly fast since the Sign algorithm chooses several random values mean-
while executes some exponentiation and pairing operations, it expends 196.5ms
when group size is 6, while the V erify algorithm raises more quicker than Sign,
it costs 297.667ms if the size of group is 6. The results are consistent with our
empirical analysis due to it needs to perform more exponentiation and pairing
for a generated signature. With the increasing number of group members from
three to ten, the time cost concerning Link algorithm also increases but still tiny
where the largest is 94.714ms when group size is 10 because it just calculates a
comparison. Similarly, the Trace algorithm grows linearly and the increments
taper off, it expenses about 41.134ms and 43.574ms respectively when there
are 9 members and 10 members in a group. All statements aforementioned are
consistent with our empirical analysis.
7. Conclusion and future work
Cryptocurrencies have gained increasing recognition. Furthermore, The reg-
ulation is also indispensable in order to prevent the abuse of cryptocurrencies.
In this paper, we proposed a fresh linkable group signature based on the Con-
sortium Blockchain to achieve the goal which tracing the real-world identity in
anonymous cryptocurrencies. Then we proved our scheme satisfied the desirable
security properties of linkable group signature. At last, the implementations tes-
tify the feasibility of our scheme.
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